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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH

UTE CAL LAND DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION,
Plaintiff, Respondent
and Cross-Appellant,

Case No. 16017

VS.

ROBERT R. SATHER and
BONNIE LEE SATHER,
Defendants, Appellants
and Cross-Respondents.

APPELLANTS' PETITION FOR REHEARING
AND BRIEF IN SUPPORT THEREOF

PETITION FOR REHEARING FROM DECISION OF
THE UTAH SUPREME COURT FILED JANUARY 11,
1980, SUSTAINING A JURY VERDICT OF THE
FOURTH DISTRICT COURT FOR UINTAH COUNTY,
UTAH, THE HONORABLE DAVID SAM, JUDGE

CULLEN Y. CHRISTENSEN, for
CHRISTENSEN, TAYLOR & MOODY
Attorneys for Defendants
and Appellants
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IN THE SUPREHE COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

UTE CAL LAND DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION,
Plaintiff, Respondent
and Cross-Appellant,
Case No. 16017
VS.

ROBERT R. SATHER and
BONNIE LEE SATHER,
Defendants, Appellants
and Cross-Respondents.

PETITION FOR REHEARING
COME NOW the defendants and appellants and hereby
petition the Supreme Court of Utah for a rehearing of the above
cause in the particulars hereinafter noted upon the grounds
and for

t~e

reasons contained herein and in support thereof,

respectfully show:
l.

The appeal in this case was argued before this

Court on October 10, 1979.
2.

On January 11, 1980, this Court filed its decision

affirming the Special Verdict of the Jury as returned in the
Court below, and in particular with reference to this Petition
for Rehearing, affirming the Jury Verdict as to Point II raised
in appellant's original Brief on Appeal, wherein the jury
determined that plaintiff owed defendants the sum of $21~00.00
instead of the sum of $46,560.00 as contended by the defendants.
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3.

The defendants seek a rehearing upon that point

upon the following grounds:
(a)

The evidence does not support the Jury Verdict.

(b)

The jury and the Supreme Court have overlooked
or ignored plaintiff's own admission that it
owed at least $46,000.00 in connection with
the land in question.

For the foregoing reasons,

it is urged that this

Petition be granted.
DATED

this~~~

day of January, 1980.

Respectfully submitted,

ullen
or
CHRIST
EN, TAYLOR & MOODY
Attorneys for Defendant Sather
55 East Center Street
Provo, Utah 84601

APPELLANTS' BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF
PETITION FOR REHEARING

STATE~ffiNT

OF NATURE OF THE CASE

This Petition for Rehearing involves the interests
of the parties in and to real property situate in Uintah
County, State of Utah.

Defendants SATHER claim reimbursement

from the plaintiff for money advanced for plaintiff's benefit
by defendants SATHER in connection with said land.
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DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT AND ON APPEAL
The case was tried to a jury upon special interrogatories.

The jury found that plaintiff was the owner of the

real property and was entitled to possession thereof upon its
paying to the defendants SATHER,

the sum of $21,500.00.

This

position was affirmed by the Supreme Court in its decision
filed January 11, 1980.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON PETITION FOR REHEARING
Defendants seek a determination that the plaintiff
owes defendants the sum of $46,560.00 for money advanced for
plaintiff's benefit by the defendants.

Defendants, in the

alternative, seek a new trial on such issue.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Defendants will restate the facts insofar as they
pertain to the point raised on this Petition for Rehearing.
On October 11, 1972, the plaintiff signed a note in
favor of the FIRST SECURITY BANK OF UTAH (Ex 22-P; Tr-29),
which note was secured by a trust deed to the real property
involved in this suit.

This real property is referred to by

the parties as the Moss Ranch.

In a separate transaction, but

also on October 11, 1972, plaintiff and the defendant
ROBERT R. SATHER entered into an Agreement which in essence
provided that since the defendants SATHER had guaranteed
plaintiff's payment of said note to the FIRST SECURITY BANK,
if plaintiff failed to pay such note according to its terms
and the defendants were required to pay off that note by reason
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of the said guarantee, defendant SATHER was to receive a
Warranty Deed to the same property as that covered by the
Trust Deed to the FIRST SECURITY BANK (Ex 22-P).

The said

Agreement was delivered to the FIRST SECURITY BANK in conjunction with said Trust Deed (Tr-62).
The note of October 11, 1972, was subsequently
refinanced and additional money was loaned by the FIRST SECURITY
BANK to the plaintiff on September 15, 1973.

On that date,

plaintiff signed another Trust Deed Note in the sum of $50,000.00
in favor of the FIRST SECURITY BANK (Ex 24-P; Tr-98),

$20,000.00

of which constituted a renewal of the earlier note and $30,000.00
of which was a new loan (Ex 23-P; Tr-31).

The new note was

likewise secured by a Trust Deed dated September 15, 1973,
covering the Moss Ranch upon which the FIRST SECURITY BANK was
designated as beneficiary (Ex 37-D; Tr-67,68).

The $30,000.00

of new money was credited to the account of the plaintiff at
FIRST SECURITY BANK, Roosevelt, Utah (Tr-67).

Also, on

September 15, 1973, plaintiff and defendant ROBERT R. SATHER
entered into an Agreement similar to their earlier arrangement,
which Agreement provided that in consideration of the defendant's
guarantee of payment, should the plaintiff default in timely
payment to the FIRST SECURITY BANK, and should the defendants
pay off the note pursuant to their guarantee, the FIRST SECURITY
BANK was to deliver the Warranty Deed of October 11, 1972, to
defendant SATHER (Ex 3-P; Tr-24).

The original of this second

Agreement between plaintiff and defendant ROBERT R. SATHER was
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concurrently delivered to the FIRST SECURITY BANK with the
Trust Deed and Note signed by the plaintiff (Tr-24).
In furtherance of the said Agreement, the defendants
SATHER on September 21, 1973, executed and delivered to the
FIRST SECURITY BANK a guaranty document in favor of the FIRST
SECURITY BANK, whereby the defendants agreed to absolutely
guarantee payment of all sums the plaintiff then owed or should
ever owe to the FIRST SECURITY BANK.

This guaranty was for an

unlimited amount (Ex 42-D; Tr-31).
On September 25, 1973, plaintiff issued its check
payable to defendant ROBERT R. SATHER for the sum of $25,000.00,
which check was drawn on the Roosevelt, Utah office of the FIRST
SECURITY BANK (Ex 31-P).

Plaintiff contended at the trial that

this money was a loan to enable defendant SATHER to buy diamonds
and to cover some overdraft checks (Tr-64-66).

Defendant SATHER

contended that the money was given to him by plaintiff toward
repayment of prior debts owed to the defendant SATHER by the
plaintiff and plaintiff's president, PETE BUFFO (Tr-257,258;
Ex 60-D; Tr-106).
On September 25, 1973, defendant SATHER, using said
check given him by the plaintiff, purchased Savings Certificate
No. 19479 in the amount of $25,000,00 from the .FIRST SECURITY
BANK (Ex 56-P; Tr-30,31), and immediately pledged &aid certificate to the FIRST SECURITY BANK as additional security for the
plaintiff's $50,000.00 loan which had been guaranteed by the
defendants (Ex 24-P; Ex 23-P; Ex 68-P; Tr-161,162,258,259).
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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By March 1974, plaintiff was in default in making
timely payments on the note of September 15, 1973, to the FIRST
SECURITY BANK (Tr-136,261).

On March 15, 1974, defendant SATHER

paid off the existing unpaid balance of said note to the FIRST
SECURITY BANK in the sum of $46,560.00 pursuant to defendants'
guaranty (Ex 49-P; Tr-39,143,194,260,261; Ex 27-P).

In making

said payoff, defendant SATHER cashed in and applied the said
Savings Certificate No. 19479 (Ex 56-P), and drew the rest of
the money from his business accounts (Ex 58-P; Ex 68-P; Tr-261).
After paying off said note, defendant SATHER requested
the FIRST SECURITY BANK to deliver to him a deed dated October 11,
1972 (ex 32-P), then being held by the FIRST SECURITY

Bru~K

under

the provisions of ch8 Agreement between plaintiff and defendant
SATHER dated September 15, 1973 (Ex 3-P).

The FIRST SECURITY

BANK, in compliance with said request, on or about Harch 15, 1974,
delivered said Warranty Deed to defendant SATHER (Ex 27-P;
Tr-194).
On or about Harch 15, 1974, defendant ROBERT R. SATHER
entered into some arrangements with James A. Sheya to borrow
the sum of $70,000.00, which arrangements contemplated that
defendant SATHER would deed the Hoss Ranch property to Sheya
as security for that loan.

Such a deed was recorded by defendant

SATHER on March 25, 1974, in the office of the Uintah County
Recorder (Ex 9-P; Ex 72-P).
advanced by

S~eya

However, no money was ever actually

to SATHER because it was then discovered by

defendant SATHER before he obtained any money from Sheya that

-6-
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plaintiff on November 2, 1973, had caused a Trust Deed to be
recorded against the Moss Ranch ostensibly to secure a loan from
Silvio Fassio to plaintiff for the sum of $150,000.00 (Ex 59-D;
Tr-181,183,262,263).

A deed back from Sheya to defendant SATHER

was later recorded on May 15, 1975 (Ex 10-P; Tr-263).
When defendant ROBERT R. SATHER discovered the said
$150,000.00 Trust Deed on the county records in favor of Silvio
Fassio, he requested and received from the FIRST SECURITY BANK
an assignment of plaintiff's $50,000.00 Trust Deed dated
September 15, 1973, which had been paid off by defendant SATHER
on or about March 15, 1974.

This Assignment was dated and

delivered to defendant SATHER by FIRST SECURITY BANK on or about
April 5, 1974 (ex 48-P; Tr-195,262).
During or about the month of April 1974, plaintiff
learned that the Deed of October 11, 1972 (Ex 32-P) had been
delivered to the defendant SATHER by the FIRST SECURITY BANK
(Tr-82,262).

Plaintiff at that time demanded a reconveyance of

the property, but defendant SATHER declined to do so until he
lvas paid the sum of $46,560.00 by plaintiff, which amount is the
sum defendant SATHER paid to the FIRST SECURITY BANK in connection
with defendant SATHER'S guarantee of plaintiff's $50,000.00 Trust
Deed Note (Tr-86,261,264,265).
Plaintiff did not at any time tender any sum to
defendant SATHER for a reconveyance of the Moss Ranch (Tr-264-266),
although plaintiff did by letter addressed to defendant SATHER
on September 25, 1974, acknowledge a responsibility for the sum
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of $46,000.00 in connection with the property in

que~tion

(Ex 71-D), and plaintiff's president did testify at the trial
that the plaintiff was willing to pay back to SATHER the
$45,000.00 paid to the bank (Tr-108).
Plaintiff filed suit on or about January 29, 1976,
against defendants SATHER (R 1-17) seeking to regain the Moss
Ranch by its paying to the defendant SATHER the amount of the
plaintiff's Tr•JEt Deed to the FIRST SECURITY BANK (Ex 37-D),
which had been assigned by the FIRST SECURITY BANK to defendant
SATHER (Ex 48-P).

The case was tried to a jury and was sub-

mitted to the jury upon special interrogatories (R 598-601).
The jury found as to matters germane to the Petition for
Rehearing tha: the plaintiff owed only the sum of $21,500.00
to the defendant SATHER in order to regain possession of the
Moss Ranch (R 600-601).

This finding was affirmed by the

Supreme Court upon appeal and it is in connection with this
affirmation that the defendants seek a rehearing and further
consideration by this Court.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE SUPREME COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO RULE THAT THE
EVIDENCE REQUIRED A FINDING BY THE JURY THAT THE DEFENDANTS
SATHER HERE ENTITLED TO BE PAID THE SUM OF $46,560.00 FROM THE
PLAINTIFF RATHER THAN ONLY THE SUM OF $21,500.00.
Defendants concede that in seeking a rehearing in this
matter their burden is heavy and that a strong case must be made
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library.
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to convince the Court that an error has been made in failing
to reverse the jury verdict (Brown vs. Pichard, 4 Utah 292;
11 Pacific 512).

However, defendants do believe that such a

case does exist in this matter now before the Court and they
respectfully restate their position.
With respect to the Moss Ranch, the real property
involved in this action, the jury found that the plaintiff was
the owner thereof and that the plaintiff was entitled to regain
possession upon payment of the sum of $21,500.00 to the defendants SATHER (R 600-601).

Defendants SATHER contend that there

was no credible evidence received at the trial to justify limiting defendants' entitlement to $21,500.00, and that the only
substantial evidence before the Court requires a finding that
defendants SATHER were entitled to be awarded the sum of
$46,560.00 as their security interest in the Moss Ranch.
Defendants again recognize that the evidence on appeal
after a jury verdict is to be viewed and construed most strongly
in support of the jury's findings and that the Supreme Court
should not change the findings of the jury where there is
competent evidence to sustain them.

(Nelson vs. Watts, 563 P2d

798) .
The evidence in the record of the trial cited by
this Court to sustain and justify reducing defendant SATHER'S
claim under the said security arrangement to $21,500.00, rather
than the $46,560.00 actually paid by defendant SATHER on
plaintiff's note to the FIRST SECURITY

B&~K.

arises from the

circumstances whereby defendant SATHER received $25,000.00 from
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plaintiff in the form of a check shortly after plaintiff
received the proceeds of plaintiff's loan from the FIRST SECURITY
BANK and whereupon defendant SATHER used said check to purchase
a $25.000.00 savings certificate and pledged said certificate
with the FIRST SECURITY BANK as additional security for
plaintiff's loan.

Defendant SATHER thereafter used the proceeds

of such savings certificate toward paying off the plaintiff's
note to FIRST SECURITY BANK after such note became delinquent.
The Court in its decision cited the testimony of Mr. Buffo,
president of plaintiff, wherein Mr. Buffo contended that the
$50,000.00 loan from the bank was arranged solely for the benefit
of SATHER so that plaintiff could loan SATHER $25,000.00 from
the loan proceeds and thus sustained the jury's apparent reasoning that this being true,

if SATHER used the money borrowed from

plaintiff to pay on plaintiff's debts, it was nothing more than
a repayment of SATHER'S debt to plaintiff to that extent.
Mr. Buffo testified that the $25,000.00 given to
SATHER was a loan, l·lhile SATHER testified that it was a repayment
on a prior debt due SATHER.

If this conflicting testimony were

the only evidence in the record, and it appears from the decision
of the Supreme Court that only this testimony was used as a
basis for upholding the jury verdict, then defendants would
have to concede that the jury having chosen to believe the
testimony of Mr. Buffo, the Supreme Court ought not to substitute
their judgment for that of the jury even if the Court disagreed
with the jury.

However, defendant believes that additional

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library.
-10Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

evidence in the record, furnished by the plaintiff itself,
eliminates any real conflict in the evidence on the point
herein under consideration and compells a finding in support
of defendants' position that defendant used his money to pay
off plaintiff's loan in the amount of $46,560.00.

Contrary to

the testimony of Mr. Buffo at the trial, the plaintiff, through
Mr. Buffo, did as late as September 25, 1974, acknowledge a
debt of $46,000.00 to defendant SATHER in connection with the
property in question (Ex 71-D).
Mr.

This exhibit, a letter from

Buffo to Mr. Sather, reads as follows:
"September 25, 1974
"Mr. Bob Sather
P. 0. Box 608
Roosevelt, Utah

84066

Dear Bob:
"In reply to your message of September 14, 1974, which
you mailed on the 19th, as you know, if payments are
to be made to Mr. Sheya, I am only responsible for a
total amount of $46,000 or a $23,000 payment. As I
told you Friday, I am making arrangements to try to
pay off my entire payments of $46,000 which I have a
commitment for.
Actually, both as myself and the
Fassios have told you, the second is not a phony and
is not to be regarded as one.
"I will notify you as to my closing date to pay Mr.
Sheya off.
If not, I suggest the two of us go see
Mr. Sheya together.
The Fassios are also too good
of friends for me to "screw around with" so let's sit
down and get this taken care of in a proper manner.
"Sincerely yours,
s/ Pete Buffo
Pete J. Buffo
President"
While the exhibit does indicate that payment by
plaintiff will be made to a Hr. Sheya, the admission of liability
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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was made at a time when plaintiff believed defendant SATHER
had actually borrowed money on the property from Mr. Sheya and
given the property

in

question as security (Tr 83-84).

Although

SATHER did attempt to borrow money from Sheya and to use the
property as security, he was never able to do so because plaintiff
had previously encumbered the property with a $150,000.00 Trust
Deed to Mr. Fassio (Tr 262-263).
It is obvious that in September 1974 plaintiff
recognized a liability and debt for essentially the amount of
money ($46,560.00) SATHER had paid the bank to discharge plaintiff's loan from the bank, which loan had been guaranteed by
SATHER.

The admission was made at a time when no lawsuit was

pending and when the circumstances of the arrangement between
the parties were doubtless considerably more fresh in the mind
of Mr. Buffo than at the time of the trial, more than four years
later.

Attention is also directed to the fact that plaintiff did

not offer any evidence to rebut defendant's Exhibit #71 after
its admission without objection (Tr 266).

A fair interpretation

of defendant's Exhibit #71 does not disclose a mere offer to
compromise, but is a clear acknowledgment of a debt owing by
plaintiff in consideration of SATHER'S payment of plaintiff's
loan from the FIRST SECURITY BANK.
Defendants respectfully submit that the jury and the
Supreme Court on appeal overlooked or ignored evidence, which
if properly considered would make the finding of the jury in
the respect under consideration untenable.

Defendant's Exhibit
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#7lis avoluntary admission of liability by plaintiff that it
owed at least $46,000.00 in connection with the reacquisition
of the property in question and it was made at a time when
plaintiff was not under the circumstances of trying to sustain
a contradictory position during the course of the trial.
Plaintiff's failure to in any way repudiate such admission after
the introduction of defendant's Exhibit #71 into evidence
constitutes the strongest kind of evidence against the plaintiff's
contention that the $25,000.00 was merely a loan to defendant
SATHER rather than repayment on a pre-existing debt.
Jones on Evidence, page 738, Fifth Edition).

(Volume 2,

The situation is

similar to that where a party's testimony is deliberately selfcontradictory, in which case the Trier of Fact is justified in
considering that party's position from the version of the
evidence which is least favorable to him.

(Wilson vs. Blair,

211 P. 289; 65 Montana 155).
Defendants respectfully submit that the present case
is one in which the Court should exercise its inherent supervisory powers to administer justice and determine that because
of the evidence before the Court, defendants' basic entitlement
from the plaintiff is the sum of $46,560.00, rather than the
sum of $21,500.00 as found by the jury.
CONCLUSION
The verdict of the jury with respect to its finding
that the defendants SATHER are only entitled to reimbursement
from the plaintiff for the sum of $21,500.00 of the $46,560.00
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paid by the defendants on plaintiff's past due Trust Deed
Note, guaranteed by the defendants, is not supported by
competent or substantial evidence in view of plaintiff's own
admission and evidence to the contrary.

Rehearing on this point

would be in the interests of justice and within the prerogatives
of this Court.
In any event, should this Court decline to grant the
affirmative relief sought herein by the defendants SATHER, the
defendants SATHER should be granted a new trial on the issue
and point herein raised.
Respectfully submitted,

or
EN, TAYLOR & MOODY
Attorneys for Defendants
and Appellants
55 East Center Street
Provo, Utah 84601

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
Two copies of the foregoing were mailed, postage
prepaid, to McRae

& Deland, attorneys for plaintiff and

respondent, 317 West 1st South Street, Vernal, Utah 84078,
this

1/~

day of January, 1980.
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